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The Great Paradox of Defence: Political 
Economy and Defence Procurement in Post-
Brexit United Kingdom 
Matt Uttley and Benedict Wilkinson 
Introduction 
At the heart of defence procurement lies a great paradox. At its simplest, the dilemma is 
a consequence of the tension between national ‘sovereignty’: an imperative to secure 
the supply of defence equipment and through this to realise the national security, 
economic and political benefits, and integration: the imperative for states to share the 
enormous costs of defence equipment production and procurement with other 
partners. The tension between these two imperatives is one of the intractable dilemmas 
that officials and politicians struggle with, and that academics and theorists scrutinise 
and explore. It is also one of the core themes that run not only through this volume, but 
through the wider body of literature examining the political economy of defence.1 
For policymakers, the tensions are manifest in a series of choices and trade-offs 
that have serious security and economic implications. Sharing the development of a 
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complex weapons system with allies may reduce its costs and increase interoperability, 
but it also presents challenges to the security of the supply chain (see Chapter 14 for 
supplementary observations). For academics, the tensions have spawned considerable 
debate over whether the notion of national security of supply in advanced weapons has 
become a redundant concept, and normative questions about how states can or should 
balance sovereignty imperatives against counter-imperatives to offset affordability 
constraints by meeting their defence procurement needs through forms of international 
cooperation and government-induced transnational industrial restructuring.2 
These difficult choices and trade-offs harry national governments even at the 
best of times when budget deficits are low and economies are flourishing. But they 
become particularly acute when public money is tight, and wider security environments 
are volatile and shifting. It is in this latter position that the UK government currently 
finds itself, following the decision on 23 June 2016, by the majority of UK voters to leave 
the European Union in an ‘in-out’ referendum. From a defence procurement 
perspective, the United Kingdom and European Union now both face unresolved 
questions about the impact of Brexit on Britain and the EU’s future defence 
procurement and defence industries. The United Kingdom has long preferred to 
emphasise sovereignty over integration in its defence procurement choices, where 
other EU Member States have historically advocated ever-closer European integration 
in defence production and supply, particularly supporting supranational initiatives with 
a view to creating a globally competitive and autonomous European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). In the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union’ (TfEU [alternatively] hereinafter the Treaty), the European Union has 
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ended up with a Treaty that supports both, on the one hand, seeking to preserve 
national sovereignty considerations while encouraging and driving increasingly 
integrated defence procurement. 
In this chapter, we explore this great paradox through the prism of Brexit. In so 
doing, we attempt not only to provide a substantive update of our pre- and post-
referendum analyses of the possible implications of Brexit for UK and EU defence 
procurement and industrial policies,3 but also to draw some of the wider implications of 
that analysis for (and towards) a political economic theory of defence procurement. 
Our analysis here falls into four sections. The first section focuses on the current 
state of the Brexit negotiations, highlighting the UK and EU27 negotiation ‘red lines’ and 
what they might mean for future UK-EU trade arrangements. The second section 
analyses the pre-Brexit ‘rules of the game’ in terms of the current resolution of tensions 
between national sovereignty and supranational integration in EU defence procurement 
and industrial policy. In doing so, it identifies the current frictions between the United 
Kingdom’s commitment to EU internal market liberalisation and EU initiatives intended 
to develop a more integrated European defence industrial policy, which have intensified 
since the UK’s Brexit vote. The third section explores the potential benefits and costs for 
the United Kingdom and remaining twenty-seven EU Member States if the outcomes of 
Brexit negotiations result in a scenario where the UK secures a preferential ‘third 
country’ sector agreement as part of a wider FTA. This involves the least disruption to 
existing pre-Brexit arrangements, and avoids the most disruptive situation whereby the 
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United Kingdom leaves the Single European Market (SEM) and is forced to operate 
under WTO rules. In doing so, the section identifies the potential benefits and costs for 
the United Kingdom and remaining EU Member States under each scenario. In the 
concluding section, we draw out the wider theoretical implications of the analysis, 
highlighting the deep, persistent tensions – the great paradox – that underpins defence 
procurement. 
9.1 The State of Brexit Negotiations 
Some two years on from the June 2016 in-out referendum, the British government and 
the remaining 27 EU Member States are locked in negotiations on the nature of their 
post-Brexit trading relationship.4 The British government – with relative consistency – 
says that the United Kingdom will leave the EU SEM and Customs Union, and that it will 
negotiate a bespoke free trade agreement (FTA) with Brussels that enables the most 
frictionless possible trade within the SEM in goods and services. Its negotiation red lines 
are to end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the freedom 
of movement of European Union citizens into the United Kingdom, together with a 
cessation of mandatory UK contributions to the EU budget. 
In drawing up these red lines, Prime Minister Theresa May’s administration has 
effectively closed down the ‘Norway model’ of third-country trading association with 
the European Union because it would require the United Kingdom to commit to a 
continuation of the ECJ’s jurisdiction, free movement of people and continued British 
budget contributions to the EU in exchange for full SEM access. At the same time, Mrs 
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May has also rejected a Brexit modelled on the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA). Although this would preserve British red lines, it would 
significantly diminish Britain’s current SEM access through new tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. Instead, Mrs May’s government has rejected the notion of a binary choice 
between the Norway and Canada models by arguing that the United Kingdom will be 
leaving the European Union from a ‘unique starting point’ of full regulatory conformity 
with the SEM, from which bespoke trading relations can forged in key sectors of mutual 
significance to the UK and EU Member States. Its objective is therefore to secure a 
‘middle ground’ FTA that would maximise UK access to the SEM while preserving its 
Brexit red lines. 
Conversely, Michel Barnier, the European Union’s chief Brexit negotiator, has 
responded by stating that the only option for the United Kingdom is the binary choice 
that it wishes to avoid: 
If the UK wanted to go further than the type of free trade agreement we 
have signed with Canada, there are other models on the table. Norway 
and Iceland have chosen to be in the Single market, to accept the rules, 
and to contribute financially to cohesion policy. But one thing is sure: it is 
not – and will not – be possible for a third country to have the same 
benefits as the Norwegian model but the limited obligations of the 
Canadian model.5 
These EU red lines reflect the political concern in Brussels and European capitals that ‘if 
the UK is seen to get a good deal from negotiations there is a risk of moral hazard, with 
 
5 European Commission. Single Market scoreboard. 2017. 4. 
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other member states questioning the link between membership in the Union and 
receipt of its benefits’.6 The European Union therefore has an incentive to ‘punish’ 
Britain in order to deter ‘contagion, but also has an incentive to portray the UK as a 
spoiler, since this helps reinforce solidarity between the EU27 and distracts from 
genuine differences between the remaining member states’.7 This is reflected in Donald 
Tusk, the European Council President’s rejection of any notion of UK ‘“cherry picking” 
aspects of its future relationship with the EU or being able to join a “single market a la 
carte”’ on a sector-by-sector approach in any post-Brexit deal.8 
Not surprisingly, the Brexit negotiations have ground rapidly to a halt, and are 
currently at an impasse because Britain and the remaining EU27 member states have 
yet to resolve the dilemmas arising from these seemingly irreconcilable red lines. For 
the United Kingdom, if the EU27 prove unwilling to modify their position on SEM access 
then the UK will be confronted with a stark choice between accepting the limitations of 
a CETA model of third-party association, or a ‘no deal’ scenario where it is forced to 
trade with the European Union under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. 
Conversely, the remaining EU27 confront a tension between ‘allowing Britain to “have 
its cake and eat it” … and “cutting off its nose to spite its face” by denying Britain access 
to European frameworks’, which would ultimately damage the Member States’ national 
economies if no deal is reached.9 
 
6 B. Martill and M. Sus. Known Unknowns: EU Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy after 
Brexit. London: LSE!deas. 26 January 2018. 11. 
7 Martill and Sus. Known Unknowns. 9. 
8 BBC News. ‘Donald Tusk: UK Brexit plans “pure illusion”’. BBC News. 23 February 
2018. www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43175201 (accessed 2 May 2018). 




As a consequence, the exact details of the final Brexit outcome remain a mystery, 
as well as its feasibility in practice, or what its implications are for the United Kingdom 
and the remaining twenty-seven EU Member States. While all this is true for numerous 
sectors and policy areas, the potential implications for the future of UK and EU defence 
procurement cooperation and defence industries are significant. This is because intra-
EU armaments procurement and associated industries form a central component of the 
defence political economies of the EU Member States. Indeed, during the course of the 
Brexit process the UK government has emphasised its desire to secure a future defence 
relationship with the European Union ‘that is deeper than any current third country 
partnership … [which] … should be unprecedented in its breadth, taking in cooperation 
on foreign policy, defence and security, and development, and in the degree of 
engagement that we envisage’.10 It has explicitly identified the European defence 
industry as a sector that is ‘closely integrated with leading companies having a presence 
across several European nations … [where] … open markets and customs arrangements 
that are as frictionless as possible are important to the continued success of this sector 
and to ensure that British and European Armed Forces can access the best war-fighting 
capability to keep us safe’.11 
The United Kingdom’s ambitions in this area suggest it is seeking to draw on its 
‘security surplus’ – derived from its national defence budget that accounts for 
approximately 27 per cent of the combined defence expenditure of the EU Member 
 
10 HM Government. Foreign Policy, Defence and Development: A Future Partnership. 
2017. 18. Available from: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/643924/Foreign_policy__defence_and_development_paper.pdf 
(accessed 2 May 2018). 




States12 – to strengthen its negotiating hand in Brexit talks. Such a security surplus is 
likely to involve using the promise of ongoing cooperation on defence measures to 
extract a bespoke deal from the European Union in the defence procurement and 
industrial sector, and, potentially, beyond. While the European Council has made clear 
its determination to secure a close partnership with the United Kingdom in areas 
including security, defence and foreign policy, its position remains that the depth of 
such a partnership will be limited if the UK is outside the Customs Union and SEM 
because this will ‘inevitably lead to frictions in trade’.13 
Uncertainty therefore remains about the ramifications of Brexit for the United 
Kingdom and the European Union in these sectors. And yet understanding the 
implications will be crucial, not least because defence industries are important areas of 
the United Kingdom’s economy as well as vital parts of the country’s national security 
infrastructure. The United Kingdom’s defence industry has an turnover of £23 billion 
per annum, including defence exports worth £5.9 billion, which employs 142,000 
predominantly highly skilled personnel.14 There remain crucial questions, too, about the 
post-Brexit future of pan-EU initiatives intended to achieve ‘ever closer union’ through 
internal market liberalisation, intra-EU armaments cooperation and aspirations to 
develop a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base to support the EU 
 
12 European Commission. Eurostat: How Much Is Spent on Defence in the EU?. European 
Commission. 17 June 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-
news/-/EDN-20170607-1 (accessed 11 May 2018). 
13 European Council. European Council (Art 50) Guidelines. 23 March 2018. 2. 
www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33458/23-euco-art50-guidelines.pdf (accessed 2 
May 2018). 
14 Parliament UK. House of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee – Defence 
Sector Report. 2017. 1. www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/Exiting-





Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These questions are not straightforward 
and the answers are far from resolved. 
9.2 The State of Pre-Brexit EU Defence 
Procurement Cooperation 
In essence, the pre-Brexit rules of the game in EU defence procurement and industrial 
policy reflect a clash between the competing logics of the primacy of national 
sovereignty versus the counter-imperatives for closer European integration.15 The logic 
of sovereignty is enshrined in the pervasive idea that EU Member States should retain 
the right to autonomy in developing, producing, procuring and trading in military goods 
for national security reasons. It is this that is enshrined in Article 346 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TfEU), which states that ‘any Member State 
may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential 
interests of its security which are connected with the production or trade in arms, 
munitions and war material’ (italics added).16 The intention of this is clear: it seeks to 
ensure that member states retain national control over security of supply in meeting 
their defence materiel requirements, but defence procurement expenditure and 
domestic defence industries are also important for national employment and economy. 
Member States have used Article 346 provisions to justify greater domestic defence 
spending to protect the industries from external competition to sustain what is seen as 
 
15 See J. Bátora. ‘European Defence Agency: a Flashpoint of Institutional Logics’. West 
European Politics. 2009. 32(6): 1093. 




a manufacturing sector of national strategic and economic importance.17 A consequence 
has been that while the European Union has succeeded in creating a single market for 
public procurement of civil goods and services, the application of Article 346 by 
Member States – motivated either by national security or domestic economic and 
industrial motives – has limited market liberalisation impact in the EU defence 
procurement sector.18 
The logic of sovereignty sits in tension with the foundational EU logic of 
integration through ‘ever closer union’ and aspirations towards common defence that 
‘have been part of the European project since its inception’.19 The integrationist logic 
holds that collective defence and the industry and armaments production to support it 
is a common endeavour among the EU states in the development of a credible Common 
Security and Defence Policy. It assumes that EU security policy should be developed 
within the framework of the CSDP through the pooling of defence research and 
development and weapons acquisition requirements among EU Member States. It also 
assumes that EU market liberalisation in defence procurement is essential to the 
development of a strategically autonomous European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base. The rationale behind this logic is built on several studies that have 
sought to identify the ‘cost of non-Europe’ arising from what the European Commission 
describes as a ‘scattergun approach’ to defence procurement arising from duplication in 
weapons systems in production, and from existing gaps and protectionist barriers to a 
 
17 J. Edwards. The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: a Step Towards 
Affordability? London: Chatham House. 2011. 4. 
18 R. Bitzinger. The European Defense Industry in the 21st Century: Challenges and 
Responses. In Bitzinger, ed. The Modern Defense Industry. 175–95. 
19 See European Commission. Defending Europe: The Case for Greater EU Cooperation 
on Security and Defence. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-




truly integrated and competitive EU single market in defence contracting arising from 
the use of Article 346 provisions by the Member States. Here, the latest European 
Parliament report mapping the ‘cost of non-Europe’ estimates these as ranging ‘from 
some 130 billion Euro, at the high end, to at least 26 billion Euro per year, on a more 
cautious estimate’.20 The report shows that ‘the existence of 28 compartmentalised 
national markets … hinders competition and results in a missed opportunity for 
economies of scale for industry and production’ when compared to procurement and 
defence-industrial arrangements in the United States.21 This missed opportunity for 
economies of scale is evident in the current level of EU duplication in procurement and 
production whereby EU states have in use a total of seventy-nine different weapons 
platforms and systems, compared to twenty-one in the United States, and have in 
operation thirty-six major equipment production lines, compared to eleven in the 
United States.22 It is precisely this logic that has led the European Commission to 
attempt to reduce fragmentation and duplicative national defence programmes. In July 
2009, the European Parliament and Council adopted the Defence and Security Directive 
(Directive 2009/81/EC) on defence procurement, which sought to liberalise EU 
markets and affirm the primacy of EU competition law by confining the use of Article 
346 by member states to ‘clearly exceptional cases’ in an attempt to eradicate national 
protectionism on economic grounds.23 
 
20 European Parliamentary Research Unit (EPRU). Mapping the cost of non-Europe, 
2014–19. Brussels: European Parliament. April 2015. 21. 
21 ibid. 
22 V. Briani. Armaments Duplication in Europe: a Quantitative Assessment. Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies. July 2013. 3. 
23 For an extended analysis, see M. Blauberger and M. Weiss. ‘If You Can’t Beat Me, Join 
Me! How the Commission Pushed and Pulled Member States into Legislating Defence 




Faced with these two competing logics, the United Kingdom’s stance is 
simultaneously supportive of the liberalisation of EU and transatlantic defence 
equipment markets and of maintaining sovereignty over key areas of procurement. 
Indeed, this is reflected in the United Kingdom’s own procurement and defence 
industrial strategy. The Ministry of Defence’s 2017 paper entitled ‘Industry for Defence 
and a Prosperous Britain’ reflected the United Kingdom’s continued commitment to 
pursue ‘open procurement’ by fulfilling its ‘defence and security requirements through 
open competition on the domestic and global market’.24 This commitment to open 
procurement via global markets is essentially Euro-Atlanticist and reflects the primacy 
of the NATO alliance in its national strategy. At the same time, UK sovereignty is 
ensured through the principle of ‘technology advantage’, whereby the MoD takes action 
on procurement decisions to protect ‘operational advantage’ (the national ability to 
maintain and upgrade its defence technology) and ‘freedom of action’ (the ability to 
operate defence systems free from external intervention) where this is considered 
essential for national security. 
These principles are evident in the United Kingdom’s alternative weapons 
acquisition strategies and defence industrial policy. In addition to national programmes 
(e.g. the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers), its weapons acquisition strategy 
 
M. Fevolden and M. Lundmark. ‘How are Defence Companies Responding to EU Defence 
and Security Market Liberalisation? A Comparative Study of Norway and Sweden’. 
Journal of European Public Policy. 2014, 21(8): 1218–35; C. Hoeffler. ‘European 
Armaments Co-Operation and the Renewal of Industrial Policy Motives’. Journal of 
European Public Policy. 2012. 19(3): 435–51. 
24 Ministry of Defence. Industry for Defence and a Prosperous Britain: Refreshing 
Defence Industrial Policy. December 2017. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach




embraces transatlantic collaborative ventures (F-35B), the manufacture within the 
domestic industry of US-designed systems (e.g. the Augusta-Westland Apache AH-1 
attack helicopter) and off-the-shelf import of complete weapons systems from the 
United States (e.g. the Boeing P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft). Approximately 28 per cent 
of total MoD equipment expenditure is allocated to European collaborative weapons 
programmes with other EU Member States (e.g. Typhoon aircraft) through 
intergovernmental agreements such as the A400 M tactical and strategic airlift 
aircraft.25 On the supply side, successive governments have claimed that the United 
Kingdom has ‘one of the most open defence markets in the world’.26 The ‘British defence 
industry’ is defined as ‘all defence suppliers [to the MoD and export markets] that create 
value, employment, technology or intellectual assets in the UK’, including ‘both UK- and 
foreign-owned companies’.27 Britain’s ‘logic of liberalisation of defence markets’ has 
enabled major European and US defence firms to establish onshore operations, compete 
without discrimination for MoD contracts and export orders and develop local supply 
chains in the United Kingdom though forms of ‘industrial engagement’. 
The same approach plays out at the European level, where the United Kingdom is 
a vocal supporter of the liberalisation of EU defence markets, but a staunch opponent of 
further European Union and EDA integration initiatives that might dilute the legitimate 
application of Article 346. On the one hand, Britain’s commitment to open procurement 
 
25 European Defence Agency. National Defence Data 2013-2014 and 2015 (est.) of the 
27 EDA Member States. June 2016. https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-
source/documents/eda-national-defence-data-2013-2014-(2015-
est)5397973fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f.pdf (accessed 11 May 2018). 
26 Ministry of Defence. Defence Industrial Strategy. The Stationery Office. Report 
number: Cm. 6697. 2005. 15. 
27 Ministry of Defence. Defence Industrial Policy. Ministry of Defence. Policy paper 




and market liberalisation has been reflected in its support for the Defence and Security 
Directive. This was evident in the British government’s review of the balance of 
competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union in July 2012, which 
sought to audit ‘what the EU does, how it affects the UK, where competence lies, how the 
EU’s competences are used, and what that means for the UK’s national interest’.28 The 
review reaffirmed the UK government’s support for efforts to open up the EU defence 
market to more competition and eliminate economically driven ‘buy national’ policies, 
‘while respecting member states’ right to maintain certain strategic industrial 
capabilities for reasons of national security’.29 It also identifies that there is scope for 
the Commission to take a more proactive stance within its existing competence, notably 
preventing ‘abuses’ of Article 346 by those member states using it as a pretext to 
discriminate against non-national bidders for non-sensitive defence contracts.30 On the 
other hand, the review concluded that the European Commission has progressively 
claimed ‘more competences in this particular area’ and ‘sees an even broader role for 
 
28 HM Government. Review of the balance of competences between the United Kingdom 
and the European Union. The Stationary Office. Report number: Cm. 8415. 2012. 6. 
29 House of Commons Defence Committee. Defence Acquisition: Government Response 
to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2012-2013. The Stationery Office Ltd. 
Report number: HC 73. May 2013. 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/73/73.pdf 
(accessed 2 May 2018). For an extended analysis, see House of Commons Library. 
Leaving the EU. House of Commons Library. Research Paper: 13/42. 1 July 2013. 85–90. 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/RP13-
42#fullreport (accessed 2 May 2018). 
30 HM Government. Review of the Balances of Competences between the United 
Kingdom and European Union, The Single Market: Free Movement of Services. London: 




itself’, and reaffirmed that the UK government ‘does not support any extension of 
Commission competence’.31 
These factors are significant when it comes to Brexit negotiations. On the one 
hand, as far as defence procurement and industrial strategy go, the UK government will 
prioritise gaining tariff- and barrier-free access to the increasingly integrated defence 
markets in the European Union, because it supports their desire for competitive 
markets, and because it is essential for UK-based defence firms to retain frictionless 
access to its European supply chains. Simultaneously, the United Kingdom will also 
want to retain the kind of sovereignty over defence procurement currently provided by 
Article 346 in its future defence trade relations with the EU Member States. Ultimately, 
the availability of such a position will be heavily dependent on internal factors in the 
European Union, and the desire of the remaining twenty-seven Member States to give 
the United Kingdom ‘what it wants’. On the other hand, the European Union has 
responded to the Brexit vote by revisiting the balance of jurisdictions between the 
Member States and the European Commission and EDA. In 2013, prior to the United 
Kingdom’s Brexit vote, the European Commission published the document entitled 
‘Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector’, which outlined 
plans to allocate dedicated funding for defence-specific R&D programmes on behalf of 
the member states directly from the European Union’s budget.32 Since then, the 
European Commission has launched a fully-fledged European Defence Fund plan worth 
€1.5 billion per year from the EU central budget to subsidise joint defence research and 
 
31 ibid. 
32 European Commission. Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and 
security sector. Commission staff working document. Brussels: European Commission. 
24 July 2013. For an extended analysis, see D. Fiott. ‘European Defence-Industrial 




development project proposals from groupings of member states. The purpose of this 
initiative is to increase the strategic autonomy and self-sufficiency of the EDTIB as part 
of the European Union’s 2016 Global Strategy. As Nick Whitney, a former EDA Chief 
Executive, points out, ‘the rules for the subsidy regime currently being debated in the 
EU institutions specify that the subsidy should be available only to EU defence 
industries’.33 A critical issue for the UK government and Britain’s onshore defence 
industry is whether or how access to this initiative should or could be obtained in the 
post-Brexit settlement that prevails. 
9.3 Scenario 1: Post-Brexit Britain in the EU 
Single European Market 
Prime Minister May’s objectives are for the United Kingdom to leave the EU SEM and 
Customs Union, and to secure a bespoke FTA with Brussels that enables the most 
frictionless possible trade within the SEM. If the British government is successful, then 
the most favourable outcome is likely to be a bespoke variant of the Norwegian model of 
third-country association because it would provide the United Kingdom with the 
highest level of post-Brexit continuity through unrestricted access to the SEM, and, in 
return, it would be required to adopt the same future SEM-related legislation as EU 
Member States.34 Nevertheless, it would also have the effect of recalibrating the 
contingent choices and potential trade-offs for Britain and the remaining twenty-seven 
 
33 N. Witney. ‘The Brexit Threat to Britain’s Defence Industry’. European Council on 
Foreign Relations. 1 February 2018. 
www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_brexit_threat_to_britains_defence_industry 
(accessed on 16 April 2018). 




EU states as they develop new rules of the game in managing their mutual 
interdependence in the defence procurement and defence industrial arenas. 
For the United Kingdom government, a post-Brexit relationship based on a 
bespoke variant of the Norwegian model is unlikely to affect the country’s choices 
concerning foreseeable major defence procurement plans and commitments, nor the 
domestic legislative basis on which its defence procurement is based. In 2017, the MoD 
published its Defence Equipment Plan, which detailed the government’s latest plans 
cumulatively to spend approximately £180 billion on new equipment and equipment 
support up to 2027.35 A significant proportion of expenditure on major projects is 
already contractually committed.36 A Brexit modelled on a bespoke variant of the 
Norwegian model would enable Britain to retain de facto Article 346 provisions, which 
would mean that it would not alter the MoD’s current ability to select from domestic 
systems, European and US collaborative programmes, and off-the-shelf purchases when 
placing future orders funded from the currently uncommitted equipment budget. It is 
likely to incur limited disruption to existing foreign companies operating as part of 
Britain’s onshore defence industrial because it provides firms with continuing access to 
EU-wide markets and supply chains. Similarly, if the United Kingdom were to secure a 
relationship based on the EEA model, then its domestic defence procurement regime 
‘would very likely remain the same, and continue to evolve as the EU regime does, 
including continuing to be influenced by the case law of the European Courts and the 
 
35 Ministry of Defence. The Defence Equipment Plan 2017. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/677999/20180125-EP17_Final.pdf (accessed 2 May 2018). 
36 Approximately 72 per cent of the Equipment Plan was contractually committed in 
2017/18, falling to 17 per cent at the end of the decade. See Ministry of Defence. The 




requirements of the EU treaty principles’.37 In this regard, Directive 2009/81/EC, 
relating to the procurement of defence- and security-related goods and services, was 
transposed into UK law in 2011, so this Brexit settlement would require no modification 
to existing domestic procurement legislation.38 
Nevertheless, for the United Kingdom a Brexit relationship based on a variant of 
the SEM access provisions provided by the Norwegian model is likely to come at the 
cost of reduced influence over EU supranational defence procurement policy than it 
currently enjoys. Although the United Kingdom would be required to contribute to the 
common EU budget in return for access to the single market, it is likely to incur a 
‘democratic deficit’ by losing formal influence in shaping the direction and rules 
governing Europe’s evolving defence internal market. It is noteworthy that the 
European Union has been unambiguous about the status of Norway and other EEA 
European Free Trade Association countries: 
[their] position outside the EU was chosen by them rather than imposed 
by the EU, so any ‘democratic deficit’ resulting from their obligation to 
adopt EU law, despite not having a voice in EU decision-making, can be 
seen as the ‘price’ they have chosen to pay for retaining full access to the 
Single Market, while shunning EU membership.39 
 
37 V. Moorcroft. ‘Brexit: the end of public procurement rules or business as usual?’ Bird 
& Bird. 9 August 2016. www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/uk/brexit-end-of-
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This situation would inevitably constrain Britain’s future choices and present new risks 
when it ceases to be an EU Member State. First, the United Kingdom’s new status 
‘outside the core EU political and economic circle’ would result in reduced influence 
over the future evolution of EU defence procurement directives. Second, the European 
Commission’s insistence that only EU Member States will benefit from European 
Defence Fund support effectively precludes third-country participation, which suggests 
that UK participation would be excluded. Even if the United Kingdom were to secure an 
association agreement of some kind, precedent suggests that it will be unlikely to have 
the same rights in the process of priority setting for the dispersal of future EU funding 
because of its ‘third country’ status. In effect, the United Kingdom would cede 
considerable influence over the content and direction of European Commission and 
EDA plans with their associated goals and aspirations to foster a more integrated and 
potentially more protectionist EU-wide defence industrial policy. Third, a chief UK 
government concern about defence procurement is that the remaining twenty-seven EU 
states should not be seen to be discriminating against US suppliers and that the UK 
freedom to buy equipment from the United States should not be qualified. Reduced 
British influence arising from its democratic deficit – coupled with the explicit European 
protectionism evident in the European Defence Fund construct – increases the potential 
risk of both eventualities materialising. 
On the face of it, the post-Brexit deficit in the United Kingdom’s influence and 
choices under an EEA Agreement scenario might be reflected in increased options for 
the remaining twenty-seven EU states to increase the tempo and extent of 
‘Europeanisation’ of EU defence procurement and defence markets. Paradoxically, 




influence from those EU Member States seeking more liberalisation of EU defence 
markets, including Britain and Sweden, towards other member states, notably France 
and Spain, which believe that the EDTIB should shield states from non-EU competition 
while helping to promote a ‘buy European’ policy.40 That is to say, with reduced UK 
influence, it is questionable whether other major weapons-producing EU Member States 
‘would continue to push for competition and efficiency in the defence industry’.41 
The potential barriers to European Commission attempts to intensify intra-EU 
market liberalisation in a situation of reduced UK influence are shown in statistics on 
the implications of initiatives to date. The latest EDA estimates indicate that despite the 
pan-EU adoption of Directive 2009/81/EC, approximately 80 per cent of EU defence 
expenditure not assigned to international collaborative weapons projects is spent 
nationally, indicating that the degree of openness to suppliers from other member 
states has been ‘relatively low’.42 A recent study for the European Parliament on the 
impact of Directive 2009/81/EC demonstrated that its impact on pan-EU tendering for 
defence contracts has been limited.43 Since the Directive came into force all of the major 
equipment contracts issued by the EU Member States have been awarded using Article 
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346 provisions, and where pan-EU tendering has been adopted by the Member States it 
has been for contracts ‘dealing with services, the acquisition of equipment deemed to be 
of low value, and sub-systems’.44 More recent reports suggest that the 2009 Directive 
has been mostly ignored by member states, and that ‘most European countries have 
acknowledged the directive selectively, continuing to favour domestic industries’.45 
Consequently, rather than permitting the EDTIB and CSDP to advance unhindered, this 
form of Brexit ‘might reveal deep cleavages in approach that have allowed other 
member states to hide behind Britain’s blanket veto’.46 
9.4 Scenario 2: the UK Operates under World 
Trade Organisation Arrangements 
The Brexit negotiations are currently at an impasse because Britain and the remaining 
EU27 Member States have yet to resolve the dilemmas arising from their seemingly 
irreconcilable red lines’ This raises the real possibility that the outcome of the 
negotiation process will be a ‘no-deal’. If this were the case, the most likely Brexit 
scenario – and, in our analysis, most disruptive to the existing rules of the game that 
govern EU defence procurement and industrial policy – is one where the United 
Kingdom fails to secure an FTA and trades with the European Union under WTO rules. If 
the FTA negotiations fall through, the United Kingdom will at least temporarily be 
forced to operate outside EU rules, regulations and directives by following WTO 
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regulations. For some, the ramifications of such a move on defence industrial policy in 
the United Kingdom and European Union are likely to be limited. As one analyst puts it, 
the European Union 
currently has little impact on UK defence policy, which tends to be more 
open to competition than is required by EU directives. Consequently, 
leaving the EU would have little impact on UK defence procurement. Of 
greater importance is wider European Defence co-operation, which the 
UK could still play a significant part in outside the EU given its largely 
intergovernmental nature.47 
In this analysis, a Brexit based on WTO arrangements might be expected to have a 
limited impact on the United Kingdom’s major defence procurement plans and 
commitments where contracts are in place, or its future ability to engage in cooperative 
intergovernmental defence procurement initiatives with the United States and EU 
members. Similarly, the major markets for UK defence exports are outside the European 
Union: some 4 per cent of UK defence industry turnover is accounted for by EU sales, 
with the remainder going to domestic sales (58 per cent) and non-EU export 
destinations (38 per cent).48 This suggests that any dislocation if the United Kingdom 
were to operate under WTO rules would be limited in terms of national defence trade. 
A key consideration is whether future UK governments will seek to increase 
intergovernmental defence procurement with the EU Member States to compensate for 
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its departure from EU institutions, or whether the Brexit vote will lead to a further 
disassociation from European ties. The combination of President Trump’s recent call for 
the European NATO states to shoulder a greater burden for their own defence (see 
Chapter 10) and growing concerns over Russia’s military activities on the alliance’s 
eastern flanks (see Chapter 17) would make this latter course difficult. Moreover, recent 
post-referendum events, including the United Kingdom’s recent commitment to the next 
phase of the collaborative Anglo-French Maritime Mine Counter Measures (MMCM) 
project, signals that bilateral and multilateral cooperation with EU states is likely to 
remain a cornerstone of UK procurement. 
Nevertheless, a Brexit predicated on WTO arrangements would provide the 
United Kingdom with new choices to mould a more independent national procurement 
and defence industrial policy. Britain would have choices over whether to retain or 
dispense with some or all its existing defence procurement legislation currently derived 
from EU directives, and decisions of the European Court and EU case law would no 
longer be binding on the British courts (Moorcroft, 2016).49 This raises the potential for 
more variance in UK defence procurement rules and policies as governments change. It 
would, for example, allow UK governments to adopt defence procurement and 
industrial strategies that factor economic and employment implications into weapons 
acquisition choices, which is currently prohibited in UK procurement law derived from 
Directive 2009/81/EC. This option is unlikely to be pursued by the current 
Conservative administration, which recently reaffirmed its commitment to a ‘default’ 
principle of ‘open procurement’.50 It could accommodate the aspiration of the 
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opposition Labour party to ‘reverse this trend with a new Defence Industrial Strategy 
which, while accepting the importance of value for money, aims also to safeguard 
Britain’s industrial base, secure high quality jobs throughout the supply chain, and 
protect our national sovereignty’ if it were to be elected in a future general election.51 
Correspondingly, a Brexit based on WTO arrangements would certainly have 
adverse effects for future UK government defence procurement options because of the 
responses of foreign defence firms with a presence in the UK to the new realities of 
operating outside the EU SEM. The UK-based defence industry made no secret of its 
antipathy towards a Brexit in the run-up to Britain’s in-out referendum. The 2015 (in 
full) ADS survey report, entitled ‘The UK aerospace, defence, security and space 
industry and the EU’, found that 73 per cent of UK-based firms believe that EU 
membership is positive for their business against 1 per cent which said it was negative, 
and that 86 per cent of ADS members would vote for the United Kingdom to stay in the 
European Union against 2 per cent who would vote to leave.52 Significant areas of 
concern identified by industry respondents were that a Brexit might jeopardise the 
opportunities for free trade with the remaining EU Member States, impede their access 
to EU suppliers and supply chains and undermine their ability to recruit skilled workers 
if the free movement of EU labour is curtailed.53 
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These concerns remain, and domestic and non-European defence firms with an 
established presence in the United Kingdom stand to lose out if Brexit results in a WTO 
arrangement in terms of reduced access to EU funds and the potential for increases in 
taxes and administrative burdens in trading with the remaining twenty-seven Member 
States. A particular concern is the future investment behaviour of the larger defence 
companies with operations in the United Kingdom that are headquartered in Europe, 
particularly Leonardo, Airbus Group and Thales UK, and investments by large US firms, 
notably Northrop Grumman Europe, which is based in the UK.54 The risk for the UK 
government here is that a Brexit settlement based on WTO rules might lead these key 
industrial players to relocate within EU Member States to maintain access to the 
benefits of the SEM and EU-wide supply chains.55 
For the remaining twenty-seven EU Member States, a Brexit modelled on WTO 
arrangements offers similar choices and constraints to a Brexit modelled on a bespoke 
variant of the Norwegian model of third country association. Britain’s status outside the 
EU internal market would offer opportunities for the remaining twenty-seven EU states 
to pursue greater liberalisation and Europeanisation of EU defence procurement and 
defence markets. At the same time, the achievement of these goals might be impeded by 
the loss of a British voice and influence in advocating market liberalisation. A primary 
difference arising from a Brexit modelled on WTO arrangements is that this would 
inevitably fragment the closeness of the European Union’s defence industrial links with 
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of Europe’s most capable military powers that currently accounts for approximately 21 
per cent of the EU defence budget.56 A key question for EU policymakers would be over 
the extent to which the EDTIB initiative could progress with Britain’s absence. The 
European Union will also lose its close ties to one of the few countries that meet the 
‘gold standard’ by spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence. As President Trump questions 
the utility of NATO, this may be poor timing. 
9.5 Conclusion: the Great Paradox 
The British government’s stated objectives in the ongoing Brexit negotiations are to 
leave the EU Single Market and Customs Union, and to negotiate a bespoke free trade 
agreement with Brussels that enables the most frictionless possible trade within the 
SEM in goods and services. For their part, the EU27 have an incentive to punish Britain 
in order to deter contagion and any further fragmentation of the Union. However, the 
future remains deeply uncertain. Although Prime Minister May has clearly stated a 
negotiating position, she may well be forced to adopt a new position if the European 
Union refuses to offer satisfactory terms in an FTA. In this sense, the United Kingdom’s 
options are contingent on the choices and trade-offs of twenty-seven EU Member States. 
It may be that the United Kingdom is able to secure a FTA arrangement that provides 
bespoke third-country access to the SEM. This will be the least disruptive scenario for 
the United Kingdom’s defence procurement and industrial strategy, but it would incur 
inevitable costs in terms of reduced influence and potential barriers to industrial 
participation. In the longer-term, however, benefits of such an FTA may be little more 
than a mirage; if the EU27 continues to pursue further EDTIB integration, ultimately the 
 




current scope and utility of Article 346 will be called into question. In this case, the 
United Kingdom, as an ‘associate’ member of the European Union, would be bound to 
follow whatever new directives were passed and would not be able to bargain for 
similar provisions. Correspondingly, a Brexit based on WTO arrangements provides a 
veneer of greater British sovereignty over defence procurement but risks the flight of 
key sections of the domestic industry to the European Union, and calls into question the 
future viability of the notion of an EDTIB. 
Thus, each of the scenarios considered comes with benefits for the UK and for 
the EU, but each equally is likely to come at a cost. In short, British aspirations to secure 
an advantageous FTA which carries all the benefits of membership of the SEM without 
any of the trade-offs over free movement or tariffs seems to be little more than an ideal 
vision of the future; indeed, the future of UK defence procurement and industrial 
strategy, is likely to rest on the choices made, not by the UK government, but by its 
negotiating partners. For the EU27, the credibility of the EDTIB concept will inevitably 
be more diluted the more that it keeps the United Kingdom at arms-length. The issue for 
the EU27, therefore, remains one of resolving the tension between letting the UK ‘have 
its cake and eat it’ and ‘cutting off its nose to spite its face’. 
Nevertheless, the overriding conclusion that emerges is that defence 
procurement in the Brexit negotiations has reverted to the norm. Both scenarios see not 
just an interplay between the logic of sovereignty and the logic of integration, but a 
deep, unresolvable tension. It is this tension that necessitates and complicates the 
trade-offs and choices of the negotiating parties; indeed, it is this tension that also 
creates the great paradox: the contending logics of national sovereignty and of 




by the European Union, has gained less traction and less support in practice across the 
member states. The ‘rules of the game’ in EU defence procurement are skewed in favour 
of the logic of sovereignty, bolstered through the provisions of Article 346, and 
intergovernmental cooperation rather than through supranational EU bodies and 
initiatives. It is too early to say what this means for the future of EU-wide defence 
procurement, though it may well indicate that the impact of Brexit on defence 
procurement will be limited. More broadly, however, it suggests that when push comes 
to shove, nations will seek to protect the sovereignty of their supply chains over the 
economic benefits of supranational cooperation. 
